5 The transmission of many animal and plant diseases relies on the behavior of arthropod vectors. In 6 particular, the choice to feed on either infected or uninfected hosts can dramatically affect the 7 epidemiology of vector-borne diseases. I develop an epidemiological model to explore the impact 8 of host choice behavior on the dynamics of these diseases and to examine selection acting on 9 vector behavior, but also on pathogen manipulation of this behavior. This model identifies multiple 10 evolutionary conflicts over the control of this behavior and generates testable predictions under 11 different scenarios. In general, the vector should evolve the ability to avoid infected hosts. 
Introduction

25
Many animal and plant infectious diseases are transmitted by arthropod vectors. In humans, several 26 deadly vector-borne diseases (e.g. malaria, yellow fever, dengue, West Nile virus) are transmitted by 27 mosquitoes or by other insect species (sandflies, fleas, ticks, tsetse flies). In plants, numerous other 28 vector species (e.g. aphids, leafhoppers, whiteflies) are involved in the transmission of viral and 29 bacterial infections. In spite of the diversity of species involved, the epidemiology of vector-borne 30 diseases can be captured by relatively simple mathematical models describing the pathogen life-cycle 31 across the main host (e.g. a vertebrate, a plant) and the vector (usually an insect). These 32 epidemiological models have clarified the impact of several life-history traits of the vector species for 33 pathogen transmission and pointed out that traits acting on the biting behavior of the vector have a 34 dramatic impact on disease dynamics [1] - [4] . But understanding the evolution of this biting behavior 35 depends on who is controlling this behavior. Indeed, many pathogens are able to manipulate 36 different behavioral traits of their vectors [5] - [7] . Interestingly, the ability of the pathogen to pull the 37 strings of its vector may yield a conflict over the evolution of these traits. For instance, the biting rate 38 maximizing pathogen fitness may be very different from the one maximizing vector fitness [8] , [9] . 39 The resolution of this conflict has been studied in several different vector-borne diseases [5] - [7] , 40 [10] [20]- [26] . This suggests that attraction towards infected hosts may result, at least in part, from a 46 manipulation of the vector by the pathogen. Yet, extreme preference for infected (or uninfected) 47 hosts can also limit or even stop pathogen transmission. For instance, if the vectors bite only infected 48 hosts they can never transmit the disease to uninfected hosts. Besides, recent empirical studies in 49 plant pathogens indicate that the host choice behavior may be conditional on the infection status of 50 the vector itself. In particular, uninfected vectors have been found to be attracted towards infected 51 plants but, after being infected, they are attracted towards uninfected plants [27] - [30] . Roosien et al 52 [26] analysed the consequences of these behavioral shifts and demonstrated its dramatic impact for 53 the epidemiology of plant pathogens. Such a conditional modification of vector behavior seems very 54 adaptive for pathogen transmission but this hypothesis remains to be investigated theoretically. 55
Here I develop a theoretical framework to explore the consequences of vector host choice behavior 56 on the epidemiology and evolution of vector-borne diseases. First, I develop a general 57 epidemiological model to study the impact of the behavior of both infected and uninfected vectors 58 on the persistence of the disease. Second, I use this epidemiological model to study the evolution of 59 vector behavior. Scenarios with or without manipulation are contrasted to discuss the adaptive 60 nature of these modifications of host preference for the vector or for the pathogen. The second phase of the pathogen life cycle is the infection of the host by infected vectors. For the 89 sake of simplicity I assume that the total density of hosts, , is a constant. This means that 90 whenever a host dies (this occurs at a constant rate ) it is immediately replaced by a new 91 susceptible host. The parameter is the probability that the host gets infected after being bitten by 92 an infected vector. The behavior of the infected vectors is governed by the parameters and 93 which refer to the searching efficiency of uninfected an infected hosts, respectively. 94
To determine the ability of a pathogen to invade a disease-free environment I derive the pathogen's 95 basic reproduction ratio (see appendix 2): 96
where ⁄ is the equilibrium density of the vector when the pathogen is absent. 97
The pathogen can invade this disease-free equilibrium when 1. Table 1 ). 107 Figure 1A shows that is maximized when uninfected vectors prefer biting infected hosts and when 108 infected vectors prefer biting uninfected hosts. The figure also illustrates that extreme choice 109 strategies can lead to parasite extinction (i.e.
1). 110
After pathogen invasion the system reaches an endemic equilibrium where the host, the vector and 111 the pathogen can coexist (the notation ̅ is used to refer to the equilibrium density of the variable 112 at this endemic equilibrium). These equilibrium densities depend on the behavior of the vectors as 113 well as all the other parameters of the model. I failed to find simple analytic expressions for those 114 densities but they can be readily obtained numerically using (1) . 115
Note that the per capita fecundities and were assumed to be fixed quantities in figure 1A . The 116 fecundity of many vector species, however, is likely to be limited by the availability and/or the quality 117 of different types of hosts. Consequently, the fecundity of both infected and uninfected vectors are 118 also going to depend on vector behavior: 119
where and are the maximal fecundities of uninfected and infected vectors, respectively. The 120 parameter measures the intrinsic quality of the infected host relative to the uninfected host. For 121 instance, 1 indicates that infected hosts may provide less nutrients than healthy ones (e.g. in the 122 case of malaria because of anaemia). The influence of vector behavior on vector fecundity can lead 123 to complex epidemiological dynamics. For instance, the dynamical system may exhibit backward 124 bifurcation at 1. In other words, depending on the initial condition, the pathogen may either go 125 extinct or reach an endemic equilibrium when 1. In particular, this occurs when preference of 126 uninfected vectors towards infected hosts becomes very pronounced (figure 1B). In the following, for 127 the sake of simplicity, I will focus on situations where 1. 128
Evolution
129
In the following I study the long-term evolutionary dynamics of the above dynamical system. Using 130 the classical formalism of Adaptive Dynamics I assume mutation rate to be low which allows 131 decoupling evolutionary and epidemiological dynamics [32]- [35] . In other words, I study the 132 evolution of vector behavior (i.e. searching efficiency, host choice preference) through the derivation 133 not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission.
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Vector evolution
138
The model can first be used to study the evolution of vector behavior in the absence of the pathogen.
139
In this case all the vectors are uninfected but they can adopt different searching efficiency strategies. 140
Higher searching efficiency allows the vector to exploit more hosts and thus to produce more 141 offspring but, on the other hand, searching for hosts may be costly because more energy is allocated 142 into flying. I analyze the evolution of searching efficiency in appendix 3 and I show that the 143 evolutionary stable searching efficiency decreases with the host population size, , the handling 144 time, , or the fecundity cost associated with higher allocation to searching efficiency. 145
When the pathogen is present, the invasion of the mutant vector involves two compartments since 146 the vector can either be infected or not. The invasion of a mutant vector can be analyzed using the 147 per-generation invasion number [36] (appendix 3): 148
where
One could use the above invasion condition to study the evolution of searching efficiency but I want 150 to focus on the preference for uninfected or infected hosts. I will thus assume that the searching 151 efficiencies and of uninfected and infected vectors are fixed and I will focus 152 only on the evolution of the preference between infected and uninfected hosts. More specifically, I 153 will study the evolution of parameters and that control the preference towards infected hosts in 154 uninfected and infected vectors, respectively (Table 1) . 155
The derivation of evolutionarily stable strategies can be obtained by maximizing when the 156 endemic equilibrium (i.e. , , ̅ and ̅ ) is set by the resident strategy (i.e. and ). Factors 157 governing the direction of selection on vector behavior are detailed in appendix 3. In short, the 158 model allows taking into account multiple evolutionary forces: (i) the cost of looking for a rare host, 159
(ii) the cost of feeding on infected hosts, (iii) the potential fitness costs associated with the reduction 160 of the fecundity and/or the survival of infected vectors. In other words, vector evolution is driven by 161 time-limitation (risk of dying before reproducing) and/or egg-limitation (risk of producing a lower 162 number of eggs) as in classical models of life-history evolution of parasitoids [37] . In malaria, for 163 instance, the impact of the infection on vector survival is reduced but it is often associated with a 164 reduced fecundity [38]- [40] . These fitness costs are expected to select vectors that avoid biting 165 infected hosts. But, if the prevalence of infected hosts is very high the opposite may be predicted 166 because the vector cannot afford to lose too much time looking for rare uninfected hosts. For 167 instance figure 2 shows the evolutionary stable strategy of the vector when it is unable to adopt 168 conditional strategies (i.e. ). For a broad range of parameter values the vector prefers to bite 169 uninfected hosts ( figure 3A ) but when the prevalence in the infection is very high in the host 170 population, the vector may evolve a preference towards infected hosts. 171 not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission.
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where the notation → refers to the transition between the states and . Importantly, these 190 transitions depend critically on the way the pathogen acts on the behaviour of the vectors. In the 191 following I will consider three different scenarios. vector. In the absence of host superinfection the pathogen is always evolving manipulation strategies 207 leading higher vector preference towards uninfected hosts. Superinfection in the vector, , 208 not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission.
The figure 3C ). The behavior of uninfected vectors is 214 driven by selection acting on the vector which yields uninfected vectors to avoid infected hosts. In 215 other words, I recover the prediction obtained when the vector controls its own behavior (compare 216 figure 3A and 3C) . 217
Pathogen manipulates independently the preference of infected and uninfected vectors: 218
Finally I consider a situation where manipulation is conditional because it can act both from within 219 infected vectors and from within infected hosts. I only consider the case where the manipulation of 220 infected vectors is fully governed by the pathogen in the vector and the pathogen in the infected 221 host can only affect the behaviour of uninfected vectors. In this case selection favors very different 222 conditional strategies in infected and uninfected vectors. The pathogen manipulates uninfected 223 vectors to bite infected hosts and it manipulates infected vectors to bite uninfected hosts and to 224 avoid infected hosts ( figure 3D ). 225
In conclusion the model clearly shows that different assumptions regarding the control of vector 226 behaviour have major consequences on the evolutionary and coevolutionary outcome (figure 3). In 227 particular, I see that if the vector is fully controlling its behaviour it should generally avoid feeding on 228 infected hosts. When this preference is at least partly manipulated by the pathogen three different 229 evolutionary outcomes are possible depending on the mechanisms of the manipulation. These 230 different evolutionary outcomes reveal the existence of conflicts between the vector and the 231 pathogen over the control of vector behaviour. But they also reveal conflicts between the pathogen 232 in the host (who is trying to attract uninfected vectors) and the pathogen in the vector (who is trying 233 to get access to uninfected hosts). 234
Experimental studies of host choice behavior
235
It is particularly interesting to contrast the above theoretical predictions with available information 236 on vector preference in different host-parasite systems. Most of the experimental and empirical 237 work investigating the relative preference for infected or uninfected hosts focused only on host-238 choice behavior of uninfected vectors. I review this work below before discussing the more limited 239 number of studies that monitored the host-choice behavior of both infected and uninfected vectors 240 ( figure 4 and Table S1 ). 241 be an adaptation of the vector who is trying to avoid low quality hosts ( figure 3A ). In the Anther-smut 248 not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission. Plasmodium relictum [15] . In a subsequent study Cornet et al. [56] showed that both infected and 315 uninfected C. pipiens mosquitoes are attracted towards infected birds. This result is in line with the 316 above theoretical predictions when the pathogen manipulates vectors from within the infected hosts 317 ( figure 3B ). This suggests that the manipulation of host-choice behavior by P. relictum acts on the 318 quantity and/or the quality of volatiles emitted by infected birds [47] and that both infected and 319 uninfected mosquitoes are attracted by the scent of this infection. Further studies are required to 320 confirm this prediction and to better characterize the underlying mechanism acting on mosquito 321 behaviour in other malaria parasites including human malaria [57]. 322
Behavior of uninfected vectors
Discussion
323
The epidemiology of vector borne disease is very sensitive to the host-choice behavior of the 324 arthropod vector. I developed a general model of vector borne transmission taking into account key 325 features of the ecology of a broad range of different pathosystems. Interestingly, this model allows 326 to escape the classical dichotomy between density and frequency dependent models [31] and may 327 help provide a more realistic description of the transmission process of vector borne diseases. This 328 model shows that extreme choice strategies can have dramatic consequences on the epidemiology 329 of the disease and can even lead to pathogen eradication. However, when the uninfected vectors are 330 more attracted towards infected hosts the dynamical system may exhibit backward bifurcation at 331
1. In other words, a stable endemic equilibrium may exist even if The evolutionary analysis of this model reveals complex conflicts between the vector and the 338 pathogen over host-choice behaviour. Under some scenarios, the evolutionary interests of the vector 339 and the pathogen are aligned which leads to a unique evolutionary outcome. In particular, when the 340 pathogen is only able to manipulate the behaviour of infected vectors, both the vector and the 341 pathogen are generally evolving a preference towards uninfected hosts ( figure 3A and 3C ). In this 342 situation it is impossible to determine who is controlling the evolution of vector behaviour from 343 observed preference patterns. 344
This result implies 332
But pathogen evolution and vector evolution can yield qualitatively very different strategies under 345 other scenarios. This conflict emerges as soon as the parasite in the infected hosts is able to govern 346 host-choice behaviour of the vector. In this case, pathogen selection favours manipulation strategies 347 leading uninfected vectors to prefer infected hosts (figure 3B presentation of the references used to make this figure is presented in Table S1 . Different symbols 605 are used to distinguish between viruses (circle), bacteria (square) and protozoan (triangle). 606 not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission.
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